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Abstract:  A growing literature aims to understand the structural change and cyclical factors that 
contributed to the Great Trade Collapse. This paper adds to the conversation by investigating the 
impact of bank distress on firms’ exports using matched firm-bank data for the UK. We use two 
novel measures of bank distress: the Basel III net stable funding ratio, as well as the market-
based bank credit default swap spreads, which best capture bank default risk, especially during 
crises. Our detailed database provides the crucial firm-bank relationship information that allows 
us to directly test for the banking channel effect on the real economy, and to carefully account 
for various endogeneities and biases in estimation. We also test for the possible contagion of the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis from the GIIPS economies to the UK. We find that the severe bank 
distress generated by the recent crises immediately, negatively and significantly affects UK 
firms’ exports, independent of demand shocks. However, not all firms were impacted equally: 
private firms and firms in industries more dependent on external finance were impacted the most, 
while publicly owned firms were less affected by their bank’s distress. 
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The recent Global Financial Crisis was accompanied by a large decrease in international 
trade – in 2009 the 3.5% fall in world GDP was associated with an 11% decrease in exports in 
developed economies alone (Contessi and de Nicola, 2013) - known in the literature as the Great 
Trade Collapse. While the severe recession in the US and in most of the Western European 
economies may highlight the demand channel driving the fall in exports, the severity of the trade 
decrease relative to GDP points to the decrease in demand being just part of the puzzle. The 
importance of the financial sector for international trade, and severe distress in the banking 
sector during the crisis suggest that banks’ problems may propagate to firms, and significantly 
hinder their export performance. How firms are affected as a result of financial crises, and the 
effects on the level and the nature of trade of restricted access to finance is a fertile area of 
investigation.  
Previous studies suggest that access to external finance is more important for exporters 
than for firms that serve domestic markets. If exporters need greater access to external finance, 
they are more vulnerable to distress in the financial sector relative to firms producing for the 
domestic market. Melitz (2003) highlights the importance of sunk costs for firms that start 
exporting. Exporters also incur significant search costs to find the correct export markets and 
higher R&D and marketing costs needed to adjust their products to the specifications of foreign 
markets. Relative to domestic producers, exporters may also face higher transportation costs and 
longer shipping times, requiring higher-levels of working capital. In addition, selling in a 
different country also increases the risks faced by exporters, which leads to higher insurance 
costs or more liquidity/ cash demands to cover for unexpected events. Chaney (2016) extends the 
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theoretical model proposed by Melitz (2003) by introducing frictions in the financing of 
exporters, and finds that the deepening of financial markets allows firms to start exporting, 
increasing total exports.  
A growing literature analyses the Great Trade Collapse identifying both structural changes and 
cyclical factors that contributed to the large fall in international trade. Our paper builds on and 
adds to the previous literature by highlighting the connection between the financial sector and 
international trade. Bems, Johnson and Yi (2013) provide a survey of the literature and conclude 
that the tradable durable goods sector was most affected during the period and that a significant 
effect of credit constraints, as well as demand side shocks, produced the collapse in trade. Others 
such as Constantinescu, Mattoo and Ruta (2015) suggest that structural factors are at work and 
that trade after the crisis is recovering slowly not only because of slow growth of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), but also because of a structural change in the trade-GDP relationship. 
They suggest that the explanation may lie in the slowing pace of international vertical 
specialization rather than increasing protectionism or the changing composition of trade and 
GDP. Lewis and De Schryder (2015) highlight that although the collapse and recovery in world 
trade appears, in aggregate to be a temporary shock rather than a structural change, the recovery 
of UK exports post crisis underperforms the prediction of their global model significantly. These 
analyses leave the door open for a potential structural break in the UK’s ability to export as a 
result of the crisis. We focus on the UK whose exports fell markedly during the crisis and whose 
performance has been weak in the post crisis period. We demonstrate that this credit channel 
deterioration during the crisis had a material effect on exports and importantly in which types of 
firm the effects may be concentrated. The results should spur further research into a potential 
structural change caused by a credit channel that is still impaired or if the crisis has induced long 
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run damage to UK firms; the credit shock may have inhibited new exporter firm formation or 
damaged existing exporters productivity and innovation behavior.  
The Global Financial Crisis and the Sovereign Debt Crisis both affected demand in the UK’s 
main export market, the European Union, and in turn significantly affected UK exports. 
Simultaneously, the UK bank crisis, witnessing the first major bank run in 140 years (Northern 
Rock) and very high levels of governmental intervention to rescue the banking sector, led to de 
facto nationalization of some of the largest and oldest banks in British economy (Shin, 2009). 
This severe banking crisis and the attendant ‘credit crunch’ were accompanied by a significant 
decline in exports. Accurately measuring bank distress is therefore central to the analysis. To the 
best of our knowledge our paper is the first that uses the most timely, market based measures of 
bank distress - credit default swap (CDS) spreads, and the new Basel III net stable funding ratio 
(NSFR). NSFR is the latest indicator of bank structural liquidity, aimed at limiting the 
dependence on short-term wholesale funding, and incentivizing banks to use stable funding 
sources, the lack of which, was a major factor causing bank distress during the crisis. Bank CDS 
spreads capture the default risk of banks at a higher frequency, avoiding the delays associated 
with ratings agencies’ evaluation of risk and most appropriately reflect conditions in the financial 
sector at an early stage, thus being best suited to capture bank distress (Otker-Robe and Podpiera, 
2012). Similarly, Chiaramonte and Casu (2013) determine that during crises bank CDS spreads 
properly capture bank risk, while Avino, Conlon and Cotter (2016) show that changes in banks’ 
CDS spreads represent a robust signal of bank failure, and “provide information about the 
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condition of banks which supplements that available from equity markets and contained in 
accounting metrics.”1 
Our paper is the first to study the relationship between banks’ CDS spreads; NSFR and 
firms’ export performance during the recent crisis,2 and a transmission channel of contagion 
from GIIPS economies to the UK. In addition while most other studies use firm level financial 
variables or industry level variables that inadequately measure access to credit, our unique firm-
bank level database has the advantage of providing the critical firm-bank relationship 
information that allows us to directly test for the banking channel effects on the real economy.  
Distressed banks restricted financing to firms. Our data includes mostly domestic private 
firms, which are dependent on bank financing, and more likely to be affected by the ‘credit 
crunch’. Earlier studies focused only on publicly traded, large and very large firms, which are 
less likely to rely on banks for their financing and frequently use alternative sources of external 
finance. This potential bias therefore can significantly underestimate the effects of a distressed 
bank-lending channel on the real economy.3  
We also account for various firms and industry heterogeneities, as well as for firms’ 
dependence on external capital, which influences the degree to which firms respond to 
disruptions in the supply of bank lending. We carefully correct for possible endogeneity in 
estimation and use novel instrumental variables to provide robustness for our results.                                                               1 Aizenman et al (2013) and De Bruyckere et al (2013) argue that CDS is a market based instrument that reflects 
immediately changes in credit risk. Similarly, Flannery et al. (2010) see CDS as a viable substitute for credit ratings 
with the supplementary advantage of a quick reaction to new information. 2 Paravisini et al. (2015) is the only other paper that analyzes the effect of bank distress on the export performance of 
firms (for Peru) during the recent crisis, but they are not using market-based bank distress measures. Rather they 
rely on banks’ exposure to foreign funds borrowing. 
3 Amiti and Weinstein (2011) use only public firms’ data to study the sensitivity of Japanese exporters to financial 
shocks, during 1990-2010. As public firms are less dependent on bank’s finance, their study underestimates the 
impact of financial shocks on all Japanese exporters (private and public).   
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We are able to build a unique comprehensive matched bank-firm dataset and show that 
worsening bank health has an immediate, negative and statistically significant effect on firms’ 
exports. The results are economically significant, on average a 10% worsening of bank’s health 
translate into a 1.6% decrease in firms’ exports. The results are more pronounced in externally 
finance dependent sectors; firms in both manufacturing and services sectors are affected. 
Interestingly, we find that foreign and UK publicly owned firms, which have access to alternate 
sources of external finance are not affected by the banking sector distress. UK publicly owned 
firms’ exports are however, significantly impacted by the increase in stock market volatility.  
We are also able to test for a possible contagion of the Sovereign Debt Crisis in GIIPS 
economies to the UK Economy via the financial system. Firms whose banks have GIIPS owners, 
or are more exposed to sovereign debt originating from GIIPS countries cut their exports more. 
These results highlight the importance of the banking sector for the healthy functioning of 
modern economies. 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section reviews the UK economy under crisis; 
then, we review the relevant literature; section 4 describes the data and the econometric strategy. 
Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 deals with endogeneity in estimation, section 7 - firm 







1. The UK and the Global Financial Crisis 
The decline in economic activity was severe in the UK during the crisis of 2008/2009, 
which we label the Global Financial Crisis. GDP fell (-) 0.5% and (-) 4.2% in 2008 and 2009, 
respectively and unemployment rose from 5.4% in 2008 to crest at 8% in 2012. Exports fell by 
6.5%4 in 2008-2009 (World Bank Development Indicators)5. Real effects occurred in tandem 
with severe distress in the UK banking system.  
The associated banking crisis in the UK, which is described below began with the run on 
Northern Rock in late 2007, and this bank’s subsequent nationalization in February 2008. This 
bank run was a rare phenomenon in the UK, the previous incident occurring in 1866 when an 
English bank had overstretched itself during the railway boom (Shin, 2009). These problems 
ensued following the fallout from the US subprime financial crisis, and the dry up in liquidity for 
mortgage backed security products, which Northern Rock’s business model relied heavily on 
(see Milne and Wood, 2009 for a detailed overview). A Bank of England scheme, the ‘Special 
Liquidity Scheme’, supported by a Treasury guarantee was introduced in April 2008, lasting 
until January 2012, to increase the liquidity of UK banks under which banks swapped assets for 
more liquid Treasury Bills in return for a fee.  In July 2008 the Government arranged the 
takeover of Alliance and Leicester, a large building society that had begun to experience 
difficulties resulting from write-downs related to US mortgage lending, by the Spanish banking 
giant Santander6. 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the ensuing systemic banking 
crisis across the world led to nationalization of significant parts of the UK banking system. 
Various assistance schemes were enacted. These schemes had as the main objectives to protect                                                              
4 Constant GBP values 
5 http://data.worldbank.org/ accessed March 14, 2016. 
6 Completed on October 10, 2008. 
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depositors in banks suffering insolvency and also to ensure systemically important financial 
institutions, whose failure would threaten the overall financial system, to meet their obligations. 
The main UK Government actions were firstly the recapitalisation of Lloyds Banking Group 
(Lloyds), following Lloyds own rescue of HBOS in September 2008, which left the merged 
HBOS-Lloyds vulnerable, and secondly the rescue of The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS). 
 Through a series of transactions the UK Government eventually acquiring 83 per cent of RBS7 
and 41 per cent of Lloyds8 (National Audit Office, 2010). Northern Rock and Bradford & 
Bingley were nationalised in 20089.  A ‘Credit Guarantee Scheme’, was introduced from 
October 2008-2012. Its purpose was to help restore investors’ confidence in UK banks’ 
wholesale funding through guarantees on selected unsecured debts.  
In total £133 billion was provided in cash to the UK banks, while all guarantees, liquidity 
and asset protection provision totalled £1029 billion10 (National Audit Office, 2010). These 
measures mitigated the full impact of the crisis but strong effects on the economy remained 
despite these actions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The connection between the financial sector and international trade has recently received 
lots of attention, and spurred several theoretical and empirical papers. In one of the first papers to 
analyze the impact of credit market imperfections on international trade Kletzer and Bardhan 
(1987) build a theoretical model that shows the potentially deleterious effect of high finance 
                                                             
7 But 68 per cent of the voting rights 
8 Of both ordinary shares and voting rights 
9 Santander bought the deposits, savings and the branch network of Bradford and Bingley. 
10 This is a total value of peak provisions when summed, not a temporal peak in the total value of the guarantees 
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costs on firms’ abilities to develop products that can compete in international export markets. 
They find that higher interest rates on financing, due to poor reputation associated with sovereign 
debt, results in lack of specialization in industries with more complex products, ultimately 
affecting country's comparative advantage, and its exports in these industries. The authors find 
similar results when firms face credit rationing due to weaker financial institutions. Matsuyama 
(2005) proposes a theoretical model that shows that agency problems in the context of credit 
market imperfections affect the patterns of trade. Chan and Manova (2015) build a theoretical 
model that explains why exporting firms’ selection of potentially profitable markets are a 
function of market size and trade costs. Credit constraints can reduce firms' ability to select 
profitable markets, but a developed financial sector may alleviate the level of distortion, thus 
increasing exports. The authors use aggregated, bilateral trade data to validate the theoretical 
model.  
A problem associated with the financing of trade is the higher information asymmetry for 
a bank lending to an exporting firm. Feenstra et al. (2014) argue that the bank has incomplete 
information on the productivity of the firm and the use of loans for domestic or export sales. 
Based on these assumptions the authors build a theoretical model in which the bank will find it 
optimal to offer the firm a loan and interest schedule that leave the firm credit constrained but, at 
the same time, forces the firm to reveal its information to the bank. Export sales are 
differentiated from domestic sales due to longer time lag between production and sale, which 
result in tighter credit constrains for exporters. Using firm level data from China the authors find 
that credit constraints are more significant the larger the share of exports for a firm, the longer 
the transportation time for exports and the higher the variation of firms’ productivities.  
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Some very recent papers have investigated the trade collapse that was associated with the 
2008 crisis, by focusing on firms’ liquidity constraints or credit rationing as a potential causal 
factor in the decline. Bricongne, J.-C et al. (2012) use French export data linked with exporting 
firm’s characteristics to analyze the 2008–2009 trade collapse. The authors find that credit 
constraints affected the exports of firms in industries highly dependent on access to finance but, 
overall, the effect of credit constraints on exports was not very significant. A similar study by 
Behrens et al. (2013) use Belgian firm level data matched with exports and imports and finds a 
decrease in the intensive margins of trade due mainly to a reduction of demand. In contrast to 
these two papers’ use of firms’ balance sheet information to identify credit constrained firms, 
Minetti and Zhu (2011) use Italian firms’ self-identification as being credit constrained from 
survey data. After controlling for endogeneity the authors find that credit rationing for a given 
firm reduces the probability of exporting by 39% and decreases the volume of exports by 38%.  
All the above papers use only indirect measures of firms’ access to credit and the results are 
mixed. 
  
The papers closest to our approach are Amity and Weinstein (2011), and Paravisini et al. 
(2015). To the best of our knowledge these are the only two empirical studies that use the crucial 
bank-firm relationship information to analyze the impact of financial crises on firms’ exports. 
This information is vital, as liquidity constraints or other firm level financial variables are rough 
measures of firms’ access to credit, and consequently impede more direct identification of the 
real credit relationship between firms and their banks.  Amity and Weinstein (2011) use publicly 
owned firms data from Japan to analyze the extent to which their exports are sensitive to bank 
shocks. The authors argue that as firms engage in export activities, they have a greater default 
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risk and experience a longer time delay to finalize their sales, and as a result, they are more 
dependent on the financial sector than firms serving the domestic market. The authors use 
matched firm-bank data from Japan for the period 1990-2010 to confirm their hypothesis. 
Paravisini et al. (2015) research the impact of loan reduction on the export performance of 
Peruvian firms during the recent financial crisis. They observe that Peruvian banks, which use 
foreign funds as a substitute for domestic deposits to fund their lending activities, were severely 
affected by the 2008 financial crisis. Their method compares the export performance of firms 
using these externally dependent banks with the performance of firms borrowing from more 
stable, deposit financed banks. The authors use matched firm-bank data that is connected with 
disaggregated export data specifying the product and the destination of exports. They find that 
credit shocks affect the intensive margin of exports with no significant effect on the extensive 
margin (confirming the findings of Feenstra et al., 2014)11. 
 
 Our paper adds to the above studies by analyzing the link between banks distress and 
firms’ exports using data from one of the developed economies most affected by the recent 
crises. Its banking sector was severely distressed and significantly negatively impacted firms’ 
exports, independently of the export destination countries’ demand shocks. The economy was 
affected both by the Global Financial Crisis, and by the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. We use 
crucial information on matched firms and their relationship banks to directly investigate banks 
distress’ impact on firms’ exports from both sources. Our comprehensive data has the advantage 
of including both private and publicly owned firms. Previous studies (Amiti and Weinsten, 2011)                                                              11 A number of papers use the information on bank-firm connections to analyze the effect of financial shocks on 
other firm non–export variables. Balduzzi et al (2014), Cingano et al (2016) and Bofondi et al (2013) use Italian 
Central Credit Register to match Italian firms with banks and analyze the effect of crisis on firm’s value added, 
employment, investment or credit. Chodorow-Reich (2014) uses syndicated loans to match U.S. firms with their 
creditors and finds that the Lehman default had a significant effect on employment for medium and small firms. 
12  
focused on publicly owned firms only, which are less dependent on banks’ finance; therefore, 
their study could severely underestimate the impact of financial shocks on exporters. We also 
improve upon the previous literature by using two novel and informative measures of bank 
distress, the Basel III NSFR, and a market-based measure of bank distress, CDS spreads, which 
best capture bank default risk, especially during crises (Chiaramonte and Casu (2013), Otker-
Robe and Podpiera (2012), Avino et. al (2016), Aizenman et al (2011) and De Bruyckere et al 
(2012)). We carefully account for various possible endogeneities and biases in estimation. We 
use novel instrumental variables to account for possible endogeneity in estimation to insure that 
our results are not biased. We also account for export demand, and for various firm and sectoral 
heterogeneities.  We find that domestic private firms and firms in externally financially 
dependent industries are negatively affected by bank distress. Interestingly, foreign owned firms, 
and publicly owned domestic firms’ exports are not statistically significantly impacted by their 
bank’s distress. A more thorough analysis shows that publicly owned firms’ exports are 
negatively affected by increased volatility in the stock market. Finally, we account for the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis to find that firms whose banks have GIIPS owners or are exposed to 
sovereign debt are more hurt, and decrease their exports more. Our results highlight the 
tremendous importance banking sector plays in modern economies, and its impact on firms’ 
participation in global markets. 
 
4. Data and Econometric Methodology 
4.1. Data 
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We use numerous data sources for this paper: firm level information for all UK firms is 
obtained from the FAME database from Bureau van Dijk; the Amadeus database12 provides us 
with the crucial link between borrowing firms and their relationship banks, which is essential for 
our analysis; the Bankscope database13 provides bank specific information, while Data Stream 
and SNL financial databases14 contain bank Credit Default Swaps (CDS) variables, which we 
use as the main measures of bank distress.   
The Amadeus database has detailed data on firms’ relationship bank(s), which provides 
us with the key information about firms-banks linkages, allowing us to directly test for the 
impact of bank distress on firms’ exports. While the Amadeus data provides the names of the 
banks firms have relationships with, there is no specific bank identifier. Therefore, we manually 
searched and matched the name of each bank listed by firms in the Amadeus database with the 
names of the banks in the Bankscope database, in order to also be able to retrieve the appropriate 
information for those banks. Most firms in our sample report only one bank. There are very few 
firms that report relationships with more than one bank; for those firms we take the average of 
the bank distress values of the reported banks. Another important characteristic of these firm-
bank relationships in the context of UK is that they tend to be very stable over time, as firms 
seldom if at all switch banks.15 This is important because one possible concern is that there are 
biases in estimation introduced by firms with higher export growth switching to better banks. We 
argue that this is very unlikely because of the remarkable stability of the firm-bank relationships 
observed in our data.                                                              
12 Bureau Van Dijk 
13 Bureau van Dijk 14 Each database covered slightly different banks and timeframes so we combined the information from the two 
datasets to cover the largest number of banks and years. 
15 Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1993) find it is harder and costlier for firms that depend primarily on bank lending 
to switch banks. Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia (2002) emphasize the challenges that firms face when trying to obtain 
loans from other banks.  
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Our firm level data sample spans both manufacturing and services sectors. We focus on 
firm level as well as bank level yearly data for the UK, 2006-2015. We interpolate missing 
variables and winsorize the variables at 1% to discard the influence of outliers. After cleaning the 
data and constructing the relevant variables we are left with 9,939 domestic firms in 
manufacturing and services sectors (from which 443 were public firms and the rest were private 
firms). The firms report relationships with 21416 domestic and foreign banks operating in the 
UK. Summary statistics for the main variables in the regression are presented in Table 1.  
 
4.2 Econometric Methodology 
Our baseline specification links firms’ changes in exports to its determinants, including 
changes in their relationship bank’s distress. We use the following econometric model: 
 
ΔlnExportsijt = α + β1 ΔBankDistresskt  + πjt  + εijkt      (1) 
 
where, the dependent variable is the change in firm i’s exports in industry j, at time t. The 
regressions are estimated in first difference, which accounts for any firm and industry specific 
fixed effects17. All regressions are estimated on a sample of domestically owned firms. Errors are 
robust and clustered at bank level. 
To account for other potentially important factors related to export growth, such as factor 
endowments and factor prices, exchange rates, etc. we include in all regressions ‘industry*year 
dummies’, which account for factors that are common to all exporters within an industry at a                                                              16 We counted both banks and subsidiary banks, as declared by firms. When a bank didn’t have a CDS, we used the 
CDS of the parent bank as a proxy for the subsidiary bank’s CDS (Coutts & Co., the seventh oldest bank in the 
world, was owned by RBS from the year 2000. As we didn’t found a CDS for Coutts, we used the CDS of RBS as a 
proxy for the CDS of Coutts). 17 Paravisini et al. (2015) also finds that variation of credit supply contemporaneously affects variation of exports  
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moment in time.18 These ‘industry*year’ dummies account for any other macro specific, as well 
as industry and year specific demand and supply shocks that may have affected firms’ exports.  
The variable of interest, which could potentially significantly impact firms’ exports, is 
bank distress. We use two novel measures of bank distress: the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), 
which is a new indicator of structural liquidity designed at limiting the dependence on short-term 
wholesale funding and incentivizing banks to use stable funding sources (BCBS, 2010).  NSFR 
is a measure of structural bank liquidity proposed under the Basel III Accord, by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. This measure captures the stability of a bank’s funding 
sources relative to the liquidity of its assets by linking components from both the asset and 
liability sides of the balance sheet.  
NSFR is computed as a ratio between the weighted sum of liabilities and the weighted 
sum of long-term illiquid assets. Therefore: 
  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗�  
Where Li stands for liabilities and Aj for assets and wi and uj are weights. We use 
Bankscope as a source of banks data, and the weights proposed by Vazquez and Federico (2015).  
NSFR thus reflects bank soundness, and is used by regulators as a signal of potential 
build-up of vulnerabilities in the banking system. It aims to measure exposure to a potential bank 
liquidity shock and hence is reflective of this exposure during the crisis.  The higher this measure 
is, the healthier the bank. We use the opposite of the NSFR variable in the regressions as a 
measure of bank distress, and if indeed bank distress curtails firms’ exports we expect a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient for the opposite of the NSFR bank variable.                                                               
18 We have 71 manufacturing and services sectors (3 digit NACE classification), during 2007-2015, resulting in 639 
industry*time dummies.  
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Second, to assure the robustness of our results we also use another measures of bank 
distress – banks’ CDS spreads, which measure the default risk of the reference entity, with a 
higher spread implying a greater risk. CDS were, created by the investment bank JP Morgan in 
1994, became more widely used since 2003, and more so during the crisis. “CDS (…) consist of 
an agreement between two parties, the so-called protection buyer and protection seller. The 
protection seller undertakes, in exchange for a premium paid by the protection buyer, to pay out 
if a specific credit event occurs, typically the default of a third debtor, the so-called reference 
entity.” (Chiaramonte and Casu, 2013). The advantage of CDS is that they are market based, and 
thus allow for timely information on the default risk of banks, and are not subject to the delay in 
ratings agencies evaluation of risk. Banks’ CDS spreads are one of the indicators that can most 
appropriately reflect conditions in the financial sector at an early stage, and are thus best suited 
to capture bank distress.  
We use monthly CDS spread data using the 5 year Tenor for Senior debt CDS19. Banks’ 
CDS spread data comes in a monthly form, which we average over the year to match the yearly 
firm level data. The implicit assumption we make is that credit supply is a function of the level 
of bank distress, measured by the CDS spread. We expect that banks that experience distress 
curtail the supply of loans to firms. The recent crisis provided plenty of evidence as banks 
distress led to significant reduction of the flow of funds throughout the economy. In the 
estimation we use the change in bank CDS and investigate whether it affects changes in export 
volumes. We expect the coefficient of the change in the CDS variable to be negative and 
statistically significant if indeed bank distress limits the supply of loans to exporters and 
negatively affects the volume of exports.                                                              19 The 5 year Tenor for Senior debt CDS is the most traded CDS and, consequently, the most liquid. It is frequently 
used in papers using the CDS variable (Aizenman et al, 2013 and De Bruyckere et al 2013). 
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There are several econometric concerns when estimating such regressions, like 
endogeneity in estimation, selection bias, and omitted variables. It may be the case that bank 
distress was caused by firm’s export performance, or a possible correlation between bank distress 
and firm’s exports exists because both are caused by external factors that are omitted from the 
regression. We address each of these concerns in turn to make sure that they are not driving our 
results. They are discussed in the following sections.  
 
5. Main Results 
 
We start by presenting the results from the base line specification in Table 2. We regress 
the change in firm’s exports20 on change in firm’s bank’s NSFR measure21 (column 1), 
respectively, on change in firm’s bank’s CDS (column 2). The coefficients of both measures of 
bank distress are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the decline in bank health 
impacts firms’ exports, and the effect is immediate. Firms are forced to adjust their exports when 
their bank faces distress, which highlights the importance of access to credit for exporting.22 This 
is not unexpected, as British firms tend to rely relatively more on financing from banks than 
from other sources of external finance. The majority of domestic firms in our sample are 
privately owned, which rely primarily on their relationship bank for external finance. Firm-bank 
                                                             
20 For robustness, we estimated the base specifications using percentage change instead of change of exports the 
results are similar. 
21 As presented in the previous section, for consistency in interpreting the results, the variable used in regressions 
represents the change in firm’s bank’s opposite value of the NSFR variable. Thus we expect the coefficients of both 
bank CDS and bank opposite NSFR to be negative and statistically significant if indeed bank distress decrease 
firms’ exports. 22 To insure that we capture not only the impact of bank distress on firms’ exports, but also the timing of the effect 
we also regressed the contemporaneous change in exports on the first, respectively the second lag of change in bank 
distress. For the lags of change in bank distress we find no statistically significant effects on exports.  In other 
words, worsening of banks’ health, which hinders firms’ access to external finance has an immediate and 
statistically significant negative impact on UK firms’ exports. 
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relationships also tend to be quite stable over time, as firms rarely report changing banks. This 
was particularly the case during the recent crisis, when bank distress was widespread, with many 
banks experiencing troubles simultaneously, making it even harder and costlier for firms to 
switch banks. This would be especially hard for exporters, as potential new lenders would face a 
high level of information asymmetry, since they need to carefully examine the various reasons 
why the exporters were seeking to switch banks in highly uncertain times.  Issues ranging from 
the health of firms’ balance sheets to increased risks associated with selling in foreign markets 
mean such evaluations become more complex during a crisis, hence the information asymmetry 
grows and the probability that a firm can switch bank decreases. Even if firms could find new 
sources of finance, the time delay may be long enough to create disruptions in their exports. It is 
therefore not unexpected that bank distress immediately and significantly impacts firm’s 
exports23. The results, importantly, are also economically meaningful; a 10% worsening of bank 
distress causes a 1.6% decrease in firms’ exports (using Table 2, column 2). 
During the sample period there were two major international shocks - the Global 
Financial Crisis that started in the US, and the Sovereign Debt Crisis that plagued several 
European countries. To the extent to which banks lending to UK firms have loan exposures to 
countries that have experienced the crises, and if the same countries are also major export 
destinations for UK firms, the crises could have simultaneously affected both banks and exports.  
If this were the case, our results would be biased.  
We therefore include in the regressions, export destination countries’ GDP growth in 
order to explicitly control for possible export demand shocks. Since we do not have export 
                                                             
23  Paravisini et al. 2015 also found that shock on credit supply has a contemporaneous effect on exports. 
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market information at the firm level we use WITS24 to obtain industry level exports to each 
destination country for the period 2000-2006. We use the pre-sample period to avoid 
endogeneity in estimation. We then calculate each destination country’s yearly shares in total UK 
exports in a particular industry and year. These shares are then averaged to calculate a weighted 
average of GDP growth for each export destination market at the 3-digit industry level. These 
proxies are then introduced in the regressions to control for changes in export destination 
demand, possibly caused by the two crises. The results of the regressions, presented in column 3 
and 4 in Table 2 suggest that the banks distress coefficients are still negative and statistically 
significant, reinforcing our previous findings that bank distress negatively affects firms’ exports, 
even after explicitly accounting for the demand shock component. This is also another way of 
insuring that our results are not biased because of omitted variables in regressions.25 
 
 
6. Endogeneity in Estimation 
 
One of the most important concerns in this type of analysis is the potential endogeneity in 
estimation – it may very well be the case that firms’ export performance affects the health of the 
bank that the firm has a relationship with (reverse causality), or that both bank performance and 
firm performance may be jointly determined by other variables omitted from the estimation (in 
this particular case an omitted export demand variable). To make sure that we control for these 
                                                             
24 WITS stands for World Integrated Trade Solution, a World Bank created software that provides access to 
international merchandise trade, tariff and non-tariff measures (NTM) data - http://wits.worldbank.org/, accessed on 
04/24/2016. 
25 The number of observations drops when explicitly accounting for export demand growth in the regressions, as in 
the WITS database export data for services sectors is unavailable.  
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potential problems, and that our results are not subject to these problems we implement several 
robustness checks.  
 
Since exports may be persistent, and to make sure we do not have spurious correlation, 
we introduce a lagged export growth variable and then re-estimate the model both with OLS and 
the Arrelano-Bond method. These steps control for any past export behavior feeding into bank 
performance, and leading to a spurious correlation between change in bank distress and firm’s 
exports. The Arrelano-Bond results26, presented in columns 1-2, Table 3 support our previous 
findings, i.e. it is not the possible correlation between exports and bank distress that drives the 
results; rather, it is bank distress which causes a decline in firms’ exports. The coefficient of the 
change in bank distress variable is negative and statistically significant in regressions on firms’ 
exports. 
 
Second, although our regressions are estimated in first differences, which control for firm 
specific characteristics, we aim to insure that we are accounting for all possible correlations 
between bank distress and firm performance, and that our bank distress variable is not picking up 
some further firm specific variables with which it may be correlated. We re-estimate the 
regressions by introducing firm size and firm productivity in the regressions (introduced in first 
differences since our regressions are in first difference). These variables have been found in the 
literature to affect firms’ exports.27  For firms’ size we use the logarithm of total assets. Labor 
productivity is measured as total sales divided by the number of employees. The results 
(presented in Table 3) are basically unchanged, strengthening our finding that it is bank distress                                                              
26 Alternate OLS results concur. 
27 These variables have been shown in the literature to impact firms’ exports. Additionally, introducing profitability 
does not modify the results. 
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which impact firm’s exports independent of any other factors possibly affecting firms’ sales in 
foreign markets. We also introduced these variables in lagged first differences, and the results are 
unchanged, the coefficients of bank distress variables are still negative and statistically 
significant. 
 
  To further ensure potential reverse causality can be discounted - firm distress affecting 
bank distress, we also implement instrumental variables tests. One could worry that firms’ 
distress might feed into and cause a distress in their relationships’ banks. To make sure we 
account for this possibility we first estimate a regression of changes in bank distress on several 
instrumental variables. Subsequently, we use the fitted values from these regressions as measures 
of bank distress unaffected by firm’s performance in a second stage regression aiming to explain 
the impact on firm’s exports. The results of both stages are presented in Tables 4a and 4b and the 
details of this procedure are listed below. 
 
First, we compute a novel and innovative instrument to account for possible endogeneity 
in estimation. We make use of the fact that essentially the Subprime crisis started when banks’ 
ownership of toxic mortgage-backed securities became public knowledge. Arguably, these toxic 
assets worsened banks’ health and, we hypothesize, these banks shocks affected the exports of 
borrowing firms. While it wasn’t possible to find data on UK’s banks’ exposure to subprime 
assets, we follow the suggestion of Chodorow-Reich (2014) and we surmise banks’ sensitivity to 
these assets using the correlation between banks’ stock prices and the return on the ABX AAA 
2006-H1 index. This index serves as a benchmark for the market for subprime securities that 
were issued initially with an AAA rating, on the second half of 2005. We compute the 
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correlations between this index and banks’ stock prices for the period October 2007 – December 
2007, and use these correlations as instruments for banks’ distress. We use pre-sample data to 
avoid further endogeneity in the estimation. We use these correlations as instruments for banks’ 
distress. We then estimate the two-step instrumental variables regressions using data from 2008 
onwards, to avoid further endogeneity in estimation. As in our base regressions the dependent 
variable is the change in NSFR (respectively CDS). We regress the change in NSFR (CDS) on 
the NSFR (CDS) variable, and use the corresponding coefficient and the fitted values from the 
first stage regressions (Table 4a) to compute synthetic fitted values to be used in the second stage 
regressions for change in NSFR (change in CDS). The results from the first stage regressions 
(Table 4a), and the tests for the validity of the instruments show that these are valid instruments 
for bank distress. The coefficients from the second stage regressions (presented in Table 4b), 
using the synthetic fitted values from the first stage as instruments, are highly significant and 
negative confirming that our earlier results are robust to correcting for possible endogeneity in 
estimation.   
 
Second, to insure there is no reverse causality arising from firm distress affecting bank 
distress we follow Amiti and Weinsten (2011) and use the fitted values from a regression of 
changes in bank distress on various firm performance variables, like firms’ leverage ratio, 
liquidity ratio, and profit ratio, as instruments. We focus on these particular firm specific 
variables as they could theoretically affect firm’s bank’s health. We then use the fitted values 
from these regressions as measures of bank distress unaffected by firms’ export performance. 
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All first stage regressions include ‘industry*year’ dummies to account for all factors 
common to all industries at the same time. The results of the first stage regressions (Table 4a) are 
very informative – interestingly, none of the coefficients of the firm performance variables 
(liquidity, leverage, and profit ratios) are statistically significant suggesting, as expected, that the 
distress of UK banks is not driven by the performance of the UK exporting firms. The results 
from the second stage regressions (presented in Table 4b), using these fitted values as 
instruments, barely change the previously found impact of bank distress on firm exports.  The 
results confirm that our previous findings are robust to correcting for possible reverse causation 
in estimation. Bank distress negatively and statistically significantly impacts firm’s exports 
independently of the firms’ performance.  
 
 
7.  Firm Heterogeneity 
 
Firms are heterogeneous, have different needs for external finance and varying degrees of 
bank dependence. We test whether firms with different characteristics are affected differently by 
bank distress. A priori we would expect that certain firm characteristics would affect firms’ 
responses to changes in their bank’s health. For example, we would expect that foreign owned 
firms, which are able to access alternative sources of finance through their parent companies, 
might be less affected by their local (UK) bank’s distress. In addition, foreign owned subsidiaries 
of multinationals with diversified activities in multiple markets may face, a lower default risk. 
Therefore, foreign firms’ dependence of their UK relationship bank may be lower than domestic 
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firms’, so we would expect foreign firms’ operating in the UK’s exports to be less affected by 
UK banks’ distress.  
It has also been argued that public firms, which have access to other external sources of 
finance, like the stock market, depend less on bank funding, and may be able to weather better a 
worsening of their bank’s health. Domestic privately owned firms, which depend much more on 
their bank for external finance, may be more affected than publicly owned firms by their bank’s 
distress.  
Another potential heterogeneity is that exporting firms in industries more dependent on 
external finance will be affected more by their bank distress than similar firms in industries less 
dependent on external finance.28  
As in previous tests, we use both measures of bank distress to ensure greater robustness. 
To test for firms’ public/private heterogeneity we re-estimate the regressions as before and now 
include an interaction between ‘bank distress’ and a Public firms dummy, which takes the value 
1 if the firm is publicly traded, and 0 otherwise. Since public firms have alternate sources of 
finance they rely less on their bank for external funds, thus they may be less influenced by their 
banks’ distress. Public firms however, may be more responsive to turmoil in the stock market. 
We therefore also introduce in the regression a variable that measures the implied volatility of 
the UK’s FTSE 100 (VIX FT)29. Interestingly, the results show that exporting firms are 
definitely hurt by an increase in uncertainty, as the coefficient of the VIX variable is negative 
and highly significant. The results show that higher volatility in the stock market negatively 
                                                             28 We proxy these industry characteristics, using pre-crisis industry characteristics of U.S. firms, that are exogenous 
to our sample of firms (see Rajan and Zingales, 1998). We follow the methodology suggested by Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) to separate industries into more, or less externally finance dependent. 
29 The variable VIX FT is an annual average of the price of the volatility index VIX FTSE 100. This index measures 
the implied volatility of the UK’s FTSE 100. The latter is a share index of the top 100 companies with the highest 
market capitalization listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
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affects public firms’ exports. Public firms are not affected differently by their bank distress than 
private firms from this source. The results are presented in Table 5.  
Industries more dependent on external finance are affected significantly more by bank 
distress than firms in less externally dependent industries (Table 6).  
 
8. Accounting for the Sovereign Debt Crisis 
 
In Europe a severe Sovereign Debt Crisis followed the Great Recession in 2011-12, with 
ripple effects throughout European economies. As a result, there is a growing interest in 
analyzing the relation between sovereign risk and banks. De Bruyckere et al. (2013) use CDS 
spreads and find that there is contagion between sovereign risk and bank risk. Acharya et al. 
(2014) and Alter and Schüler (2012) also found links amongst the two types of risk, with 
sovereign risk affecting the bank risk after Government bailouts. Bart et al (2012) show that 
although most of the GIIPS countries’ sovereign debt was held by domestic banks, a significant 
part of GIIPS sovereign debt was also held by other European banks, from non-GIIPS countries, 
significantly increasing these banks’ risk levels.  
We test for a possible contagion of the Sovereign Debt Crisis from GIIPS economies to 
the UK. This allows us to expand the scope of the research to answer additional questions about 
how UK exports are vulnerable to financial distress in foreign countries system spilling over to 
the UK economy via the global financial system.  Banks operating in the UK with GIIPS owners, 
or with larger GIIPS sovereign debt in their portfolios may have been more negatively affected 
than other banks, that were less exposed to GIIPS sovereign debt.   An increase in the risk 
associated with the GIIPS sovereign debt owned by banks significantly decreases the value of 
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these assets, and, as a result, banks tighten lending more and charge higher interest in the crisis 
period than banks with lower sovereign risk exposures (Acharya et al., 2014). If this is the case, 
firms whose relationship banks have high GIIPS exposure may be more negatively affected, and 
experience sharper decline in their exports. 
 In an effort to capture the impact of the Sovereign Debt Crisis we investigate to what 
extent bank exposure to GIIPS sovereign debt impacted firms’ response to bank distress. We 
make use of unique data from the EU-wide stress tests undertaken by the European Banking 
Authority. We obtain detailed information about banks’ holdings of various countries’ sovereign 
debt. A closer look at the geographical distribution of sovereign debt owned by banks reveals a 
strong home bias. GIIPS countries’ banks hold on average more than 50% of their sovereign debt 
assets originating in GIIPS countries (for Italian banks the proportion is even higher, Italian 
banks holding more than 90% of sovereign debt assets in GIIPS sovereign debt). This is not the 
case for banks from other countries – French banks tend to have a higher GIIPS sovereign debt 
exposure than other non-GIIPS banks, on average 16% - 21% of their sovereign debt exposure is 
in GIIPS bonds. Out of the German banks, only Commerzbank has a 20% ratio, the other banks’ 
ratios are in the single digits. As for the British banks, the exposure is relatively low - Lloyd 0%, 
HSBC 4%, RBS 7%, and Barclays 12.5%. As a result, we expect a stronger effect of the 
sovereign debt crisis on GIIPS banks, or on banks with GIIPS owners and, consequently, we 
expect more stringent financial constraints for firms that take loans from GIIPS owned banks.  
 We follow Acharya et al. (2014) and introduce in the regression a newly composed 
variable, which captures bank ownership. We use the Bankscope database to construct the 
dummy variable GIIPS owned, which takes value 1 if a bank is from GIIPS countries or it is 
controlled by an entity from a GIIPS country, and zero otherwise. We expect the coefficient 
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associated with this variable to be negative and statistically significant. Furthermore, we make 
use of the unique data from the European banks stress tests and calculate a GIIPS intensity 
variable, which captures the intensity of GIIPS sovereign debt holdings. For each bank from the 
stress test data that is relevant for the UK firms, we compute the ratio of GIIPS issued sovereign 
debt relative to the total sovereign debt from the EU. For the stress tests from the year 2011 and 
from 2014 (for which we have individual bank data available), we compute the median for this 
ratio for each year and identify the banks with a higher ratio than the median. The GIIPS 
intensity variable takes value of 1 for banks with the ratio higher than the respective median for 
both years (2011 and 2014) and 0 in the rest.   
 We next re-estimate the regressions and account successively for GIIPS ownership, and 
for GIIPS debt intensity. The results, presented in Table 7, show a negative, statistically 
significant effect of banks’ GIIPS affiliation or GIIPS sovereign debt exposure on firms’ exports, 
in addition to the negative impact of bank distress. The bank distress variable has negative 
coefficients, and these coefficients are statistically significant in regressions with the change in 
exports as the dependent variable. When we use the variable GIIPS intensity instead of GIIPS 
owned in regressions, the results are similar. The results show that the Sovereign Debt Crisis had 
real effects and impacted UK firms’ export performance. Firms whose relationship banks have 
large GIIPS exposures have been more negatively affected, and experienced sharper declines in 
their exports. Such results therefore unravel an extra layer of the complexity of the fall in UK 
exports and illuminate an additional transmission channel. 
 
9. Other Robustness Checks 
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 It may be argued that a few outliers – banks that suffered the most during the crisis, or 
banks that serve a large number of the firms in the sample, may influence our results. We 
therefore identified the banks with the largest number of firms listing them as a source of 
funding. Barclays Bank leads, with close to 30% of the firms in our sample listing it as their 
relationship bank, followed by Royal Bank of Scotland (6.85% for RBS and 18.64% for 
NatWest, which is part of RBS), HSBC, with 17.56% and Lloyds with 14.18% of the firms. We 
re-estimate the regressions using the data from all the firms with the exception of firms in a 
relationship with Barclays Bank. We repeat the exercise after dropping sequentially each of the 
banks with large number of customer firms (we dropped RBS, HSBC and Lloyds one by one). 
We even drop combinations of the top two banks with most customer firms (Barclays Bank and 
RBS), and re-estimate the regressions. In all the cases the results are consistent with our previous 
findings. As a result of these tests it becomes less likely that our results are driven by a small 
number of large banks that serve a large number of firms and which suffered the most distress 
during the crisis.30 
 
10. Conclusion 
Our paper focuses on the UK economy and examines to what extent the distress in the 
banking sector affects firms’ export volumes. The motivation for our research is to bridge a 
deficit in the existing literature on the effects of bank distress on its borrowing firms’ 
performance. We build a unique firm-bank level database that has the advantage of providing 
detailed firm-bank relationship s that allows us to directly test for the banking channel effects on 
the real economy. We focus on the UK, a large developed economy that was affected directly                                                              
30 The results are available upon request. 
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and extensively by the recent crises, and whose export performance has been weak in the post 
crisis period. The paper seeks to establish the scale and scope of credit frictions that reduced 
exports and in which firms the effects may be concentrated. 
Our results show that worsening bank heath negatively and statistically significantly 
affects UK firms’ exports.  Interestingly, the effects of the bank distress are immediate. As bank 
ability to access finance decreased, so did the loans to their customer firms, which were then 
forced to cut exports. The results are economically significant, on average a 10% worsening of 
bank’s health translate into a 1.6% decrease in firm’s exports. The results hold for both 
manufacturing and services, and are robust to carefully correcting for possible endogeneity in 
estimation. Domestic private firms, which rely primarily on their banks for funds are 
immediately negatively affected by their relationship bank’s distress. Remarkably, we find that 
foreign firms and public domestic firms that have access to alternate sources of finance are not 
affected by banking sector distress. In contrast, domestic publicly owned firms are negatively 
affected by stock market volatility.  
 
The results highlight the importance of banking sector for modern economies and stress 
the tremendous impact bank distress can have on exports. The results may have significance in 
the debate regarding the resilience of the economy to economic or financial shocks in the face of 
firms’ high dependency on banks rather than the use of public markets for funding. The paper 
should also enhance further research on whether a structural change indeed occurred in the UK 
post 2008. Persistently weak exports in the UK post crisis mean that knowing whether the credit 
30  
shock inhibited new exporter firm-formation, damaged existing exporters’ productivity or, if 
credit starvation to firms persists are all important areas for future research. 
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Note: Table 1 provides summary statistics on firm characteristics and bank distress (proxied by NSFR or CDS). We 
present most of the variables as differences between variables at t and t-1 as they are used in regressions. For firms’ 
size we use the logarithm of total assets. Labor productivity is measured as total sales divided by the number of 
employees. Liquidity ratio is measured as the ratio between the difference between current assets and current 
liabilities and total assets. Leverage ratio is measured as the ratio between short term loans and current assets. Profit 
ratio is defined as the ration between the difference between revenue and operating expenses and total assets. For the 
variable “Dependence on external finance” we use as a proxy the industry characteristics of U.S. firms pre-crisis, 
which therefore, are exogenous to our sample of firms (see Rajan and Zingales, 1998). We follow the methodology 
suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to separate industries into more, or less externally finance dependent.The 
variable “Market growth for export destinations” is computed at 3 digits industry level and using  the pre-sample 
period (2000-2006) to avoid endogeneity in estimation. 
  
Table 1 Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Change in ln(export) 45,534 0.007 0.670 -9.823 8.572
Change in CDS 45,534 -0.002 0.073 -0.767 1.035
Change in NSFR 44,668 -0.001 0.076 -0.527 0.618
Age 45,534 30.480 23.046 0.000 158.000
Size 45,534 9.958 1.465 3.178 14.581
Labor productivity 45,534 753.041 8245.012 0.332 879535.000
Change in liquidity ratio 38,580 0.010 0.355 -20.535 28.889
Change in leverage ratio 41,377 0.075 21.594 -2378.000 3001.314
Change in profit ratio 45,520 -0.003 1.491 -215.395 137.354
Dependence on external finance 41,862 0.544 0.498 0.000 1.000
Market growth for export destinations 21,031 1.592 1.781 -4.833 5.843
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Note: The regressions are estimated in first difference, which accounts for any firm and industry specific fixed 
effects. The coefficients of both measures of bank distress are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that 
the decline in bank health impacts firms’ exports, and the effect is immediate. The results are economically 






Table 2.  Baseline regressions
Dependent variable Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export)
VARIABLES
Δ NSFR -0.0447*** -0.0588***
[-16.42] [-7.419]
Δ CDS -0.144* -0.121*
[-2.438] [-2.226]
Export Destination Market Growth 0.0131*** 0.0137***
[136.0] [333.5]
Fixed effects (industry * year) yes yes yes yes
Observations 52,720 48,479 40,446 38,562
R-squared 0.025 0.026 0.055 0.061
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Note: Since exports may be persistent, and to make sure we do not have spurious correlation, we introduce a lagged 
export growth variable and re-estimate the model with the Arrelano-Bond method. The coefficients of the change in 
bank distress variables (NSFR and CDS) are negative and statistically significant in regressions on firms’ exports. 
For robustness, we re-estimate the regressions by introducing in the regressions firm size and firm productivity 
(introduced in first differences since our regressions are in first difference). For firms’ size we use the logarithm of 
total assets. Labor productivity is measured as total sales divided by the number of employees. The results (columns 
3-4) are basically unchanged. We also introduced these variables in lagged first difference (columns 5-6), and the 
results are unchanged, the coefficients of bank distress variables are still negative and statistically significant.  
Table 3. Accounting for lagged exports, and firm specific variables
Dependent variable Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export)
Δ NSFR -0.0588*** -0.0247*** -0.0432***
[-7.419] [-4.665] [-3.866]
Δ CDS -0.121* -0.165* -0.166*
[-2.226] [-2.071] [-2.070]
Δ ln(export)_lag -0.172*** -0.186***
[-248.4] [-254.0]
Δ Size 4.34e-07*** 3.83e-07***
[31.23] [32.76]
Δ Productivity 3.47e-06*** 3.36e-06***
[131.4] [212.1]
Δ Size_lag 2.25e-07*** 2.33e-07***
[114.8] [122.6]
Δ Productivity_lag -1.58e-06*** -1.57e-06***
[-177.4] [-581.0]
Fixed effects (industry * year) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 40,446 38,562 52,632 48,270 45,844 43,518
R-squared 0.055 0.061 0.029 0.03 0.025 0.026
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Note: To control for endogeneity, we also implement instrumental variables procedures. We first estimate a regression of changes in bank distress on several instrumental 
variables. Subsequently, we use the fitted values from these regressions as measures of bank distress unaffected by firm’s performance in a second stage regression aiming to 
explain the impact on firm’s exports. The results of both stages are presented in Tables 4a and 4b. For the first instrument,  we follow the suggestion of Chodorow-Reich (2014) 
and we surmise banks’ sensitivity to the subprime assets using the correlation between banks’ stock prices and the return on the ABX AAA 2006-H1 (an index of subprime 
securities). We compute the correlations between this index and banks’ stock prices for the period October 2007 – December 2007, and use these correlations as instruments for 
banks’ distress. We use pre-sample data to avoid further endogeneity in the estimation. We use these correlations as instruments for banks’ distress. Second, to insure there is no 
reverse causality arising from firm distress affecting bank distress we  follow Amiti and Weinsten (2011) and use the fitted values from a regression of changes in bank distress on 
various firm performance variables, like firms’ leverage ratio, liquidity ratio, and profit ratio as instruments. We focus on these particular firm specific variables as they could 
theoretically affect firm’s bank’s health.  
 
Table 4.a Correcting for endogeneity  - Instrumental variables - First Stage Regressions
Dependent variable Δ CDS Δ NSFR Δ CDS Δ NSFR Δ CDS Δ NSFR Δ CDS Δ NSFR
Correlation Bank's stock price and Subprime Index 0.0307* 0.165
[2.365] [1.288]
Change liquidity ratio 0.0003 -0.0003
[0.57] [-0.32]
Change leverage ratio -2E-07 4.89E-06
[-1.379] [1.27]
Change Profit/ Total Assets -4.16E-05 2.28E-05
[-0.79] [1.795]
Fixed effects (industry * year) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 47,209 48,624 41,564 46,021 45,663 50,715 50,486 56,089






Table 4.b Correcting for endogeneity - Instrumental variables - Second stage regressions
Dependent variable Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export)
eCorrelation Bank's stock price and Subprime Index - NSFR -9.822***
[-8.138]
eCorrelation Bank's stock price and Subprime Index - CDS -588.1***
[-43.66]
eLiq - NSFR 0.00689**
[2.503]
eLiq - CDS -0.149**
[-3.211]
eLev - NSFR -0.0210***
[-13.37]
eLev - CDS -0.115**
[-3.447]
eEBIT - NSFR -0.0380***
[-21.35]
eEBIT - CDS -0.0891**
[-2.862]
Fixed effects (industry * year) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 48,624 47,209 46,021 41,564 50,715 45,663 56,089 50,486
R-squared 0.023 0.023 0.034 0.033 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.025
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Note: To test for firms’ heterogeneity we re-estimate the regressions and include an interaction between bank distress and Public firms dummy (which has value 1 if the firm is 
publicly traded, 0 otherwise) – columns 1 & 3. Public firms may rely less on their bank (less influenced by their banks’ distress) but they may be more responsive to the stock 
market. We also introduce in the regression a variable that measures the implied volatility of the UK’s FTSE 100 (VIX FT) – columns 2 & 4. The results show that exporting firms 
are hurt by an increase in uncertainty, public firms are not affected differently by their bank distress than private firms.  
Table 5 Firm heterogeneity - public versus private domestic firms
Dependent variables Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export)
VARIABLES
Δ NSFR -0.0381*** -0.0378***
[-31.89] [-19.16]
Δ CDS -0.146* -0.152*
[-2.395] [-2.323]
Δ NSFR x Public firm -0.0015
[-0.0799]
Δ CDS x Public firm -0.153
[-1.147]
Public firm 0.0387*** 0.0392*** 0.0272*** 0.0271***
[15.98] [18.56] [9.984] [13.13]
Δ VIX x Public firm 0.00207** 0.000891
[2.721] [1.129]
Δ VIX -0.0940*** -0.0170***
[-84,710] [-37.65]
Fixed effects (industry * year) yes yes yes yes
Observations 56169 56169 51467 51467
R-squared 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.027
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Note: Firms in industries more dependent on external finance are affected significantly more by bank distress than firms in less externally dependent industries.  
We follow the methodology suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to separate industries into more, or less externally finance dependent. As expected, 
exporters in industries more dependent on external finance are more hurt by their bank distress. 
  
Table 6. Industry Heterogeneity - industry dependence on external finance
Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export)
Δ NSFR -0.0816*** 0.0355
[-64.36] [0.164]
Δ CDS -0.226** -0.0308
[-4.023] [-0.410]
Fixed effects (industry * year) yes yes yes yes
Observations 28553 25997 23066 21325
R-squared 0.033 0.034 0.026 0.016
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable
Domestic owned firms in industries 
more  dependent on external finance
Domestic owned firms in industries 
less  dependent on external finance
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Table 7. Accounting for the Sovereign Debt Crisis 
          
Dependent variable  Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) Δ ln(export) 
          
VARIABLES     
     
Δ NSFR -0.0389*** -0.0429***    [-24.97] [-27.57]   
Δ CDS   -0.0879** -0.0873** 
   [-2.853] [-2.868] 
GIIPS owned -0.0123**  -0.0124**  
 [-3.029]  [-2.584]  
GIIPS intensive   -0.00772***  -0.00543*** 
  [-13.11]  [-7.948] 
     
Fixed effects (industry * year) yes yes yes yes 
Observations 56169 56,169 50,557 50,557 
R-squared 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.025 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
Note: We expect a stronger effect of the sovereign debt crisis on banks with GIIPS owners or for higher GIIPS sovereign debt intensity, leading to more stringent financial 
constraints for firms that take loans from these. We re-estimate the regressions and account successively for GIIPS ownership, and for GIIPS sovereign debt intensity. We found a 
negative, statistically significant effect of banks’ GIIPS affiliation or GIIPS sovereign debt exposure on firms’ exports, in addition to the negative impact of bank distress. The 
result show that the Sovereign Debt Crisis had real effects and impacted firms’ performance. Firms whose relationship banks have large GIIPS exposures have been more 
negatively affected, and experienced sharper decline in their exports. 
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